THE ZIONIST STATE
[Harbinger of World War III]
It has been said by insiders
from many quarters that three world wars will be necessary in order to complete
the long-laid plan for World Dominion.
After WWI, the Versailles treaty
- of which the measures against Germany guaranteed a second
World War - M. Clemenceau boasted that
'we are carrying the war on into
the peace'.
"Full Responsibility for the First world War, lies squarely on the shoulders of the International Jewish Bankers. They are responsible for millions of dead and dying". -- U.S. Congress - Record 67th Congress, 4. Sitting, Senate Document nr. 346)"The bolshevik Revolution in russia was the work of Jewish planning and Jewish dissatisfaction. Our Plan is to have a New world Order. what worked so wonderfully in Russia, is going to become Reality for the whole world." -- The American Hebrew Magazine, 10, Sept. 1920"By using the new atheist exile politics they [the Zionists] provoked and increased anti-Semitism in Europe which led to the Second world War. . . The worldwide boycott against Germany in 1933 and the later all-out declaration of war against Germany, initiated by the Zionist leaders and the World Jewish Congress. . . " -- Rabbi Schwartz, New York Times, Sept. 30, 1997
On April 27, 2002 an article
in the Arizona Daily Star carried a report with a statement
by Ra'anan Gissen, a senior adviser to Ariel Sharon.
WWIII Is Coming 'Whether They Like It Or Not' - Top Sharon Aide"The Terror attacks on September 11 and extreme turmoil in the Middle East point to one thing - World War III, a spokesman for Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon said Friday during a visit to Tucson.""We've been fighting a war for the past 18 months, which is the harbinger of World War III. The world is going to fight, whether they like it or not. I'm sure". [Gissen stated]
In the
first half of this chapter of Douglas Reed's book, Controversy of Zion,
we're given a detailed -- almost microscopic -- look behind the scenes
at the manipulations, threats, bribes and murders committed in order to secure
the vote by the United Nations, mandating the 'state' of Israel as a
homeland for the so-called Jews. He describes the 'contest' between Republicans
and Democrats -- their fawning promises of capitulation -- before the upcoming
presidential election to garner financial support and votes from the Jews.
Many people died in their
attempts to sound the warning, including Mr. James Forrestal, U.S. Secretary
for Defence, when he failed to heed the warnings of Bernard Baruch to 'back
off'.
The second half of the chapter
draws a gruesome picture of the bloody terror in Palestine that began
simultaneously with the UN mandate. This a MUST READ, even for those who
believe they know the facts. Reed's research appears to be indisputable and
verifiable.
You'll read statements by
many people in high places who feared for the future of the world if the
mandate was passed, and they predicted it would lead to a third world
war.
First, a couple of paragraphs from
the preface to explain the twenty-two-year gap between the completion of
this vital book and it's publication, which can be purchased from Omni Christian
Book Club. You can find ordering information in our
Resources section, at
the bottom of the page. Here's the preface excerpt:
". . . The disappearance into almost total oblivion of Douglas Reed and all his works was a change that could not have been wrought by time alone. Indeed, the correctness of his interpretation of the unfolding history of his time found some confirmation in what happened to him when at the height of his powers.
"After 1951, with the publication of Far and Wide, in which he set the history of the United States of America into the context of all he had learned in Europe of the politics of the world, Reed found himself banished from the bookstands, all publishers' doors closed on him, and those books already written liable to be withdrawn from library shelves and 'lost', never to be replaced.
"His public career as a writer now apparently at an end, Reed was at last free to undertake a great task for which all that had gone before -- his years as a foreign correspondent, his travels in Europe and America, his conversations and contacts with the great political leaders of his day, plus his eager absorption through reading and observation of all that was best in European culture -- were but a kind of preparation and education that no university could provide and which only the fortunate and gifted few could fully use.
"Experiences which other men might have accepted as defeat, served only to focus Reed's powers on what was to be his most important undertaking -- that of researching and retelling the story of the last 2,000 years and more in such a way as to render intelligible much of modern history which, for the masses, remains in our time steeped in darkness and closely guarded by the terrors of an invisible system of censorship. . . " IVOR BENSON, Durban, Natal, August 1978Benson goes on to tell of Reed's three-year period of research and writing the book, with the Epilogue being added in 1956, then, the book gathering dust for twenty-two years, until it was finally published in 1978 by the Dolphin Press, Durban, Natal, South Africa.
Knowing this, dear reader -- knowing how desperately you are NOT wanted to have this information -- I hope your desire for truth and understanding is strong enough that you will get the book and read it from cover to cover. It does, indeed, lay the groundwork for other smaller gems written by various authors -- several of which are posted here -- that help us to at least begin to grasp the breadth and depth of an International Priesthood's insidious, centuries-long plan for World Dominion.
This is not to say that Doug Reed is infallible, for, being human, that would be impossible.
We've given here a few excerpted quotes from the chapter as it so pertains to today, reminding you it was written fifty years ago. Many of Reed's statements appear to be prophetic. Actually, he saw the 'writing on the wall'. We've broken the chapter into two parts as it's among the few longest chapters of the book and we present it to you, with love.
-- Jackie --
January 27th, 2004
______________________________________
* . . . everyone connected with it will be hunted down and put to death * . . . this means that even the Zionist state set up after the Second World War by no means fulfills the intention of those who made the Balfour Declaration, and that further conquests of Arab lands have yet to be made by war.
* As in American elections, so in this British one of 1945 the power to "deliver the votes" was shown. Mr. Churchill had gone far in "arming the Jews" and in privately committing himself to Zionism, but not far enough for Dr. Weizmann.
* In England at the mid-century, control of the press was virtually complete.
* They depict what will inevitably happen one day, but that day has been put back to some time after another ruinous era in Palestine, which will probably involve the world.
* Then he [Harry Truman] turned his gaze on domestic affairs and the next Congressional and presidential elections. In these, he knew (and said), the Zionist-controlled vote was decisive.
* The "activists" (as they prefer to call themselves) were left with power to ignite a third world conflict when they pleased.
* Very large sums were obtained from Jewish contributors and they would be influenced in either giving or withholding by what the President did on Palestine".
* If American troops in the 1950's or 1960's [or 1990's or in the 21st Century] find themselves in the Middle East, any of them who have read Mr. Forrestal's Diaries should know how they come to be there.
* Mr. Forrestal must have acted from a sense of duty, not of hope, when he implored Mr. McGrath "to give a lot of thought to this matter because it involved not merely the Arabs of the Middle East, but also might involve the whole Moslem world with its four hundred millions of people: Egypt, North Africa, India and Afghanistan".* His [Mr. Forrestal's] end needs to be described here, before the armed seizure of Palestine is recorded; it is the classic case of persecution by defamation, leading to death.
______________________________________________
Here's the last two paragraphs of the preceding
chapter, "The Talmudic Vengeance", for the sake of continuity. [All emphasis
is the author's.]
This brings the story nearly down to our present day and what remains will be discussed in a concluding chapter. When the revolution spread outward into the area abandoned to it by the West in 1945 the history of 1917-1918 in Russia was repeated.
A Talmudic vengeance was wreaked and Jewish governments were with obvious intent set up everywhere. There was no great change in that state of affairs, either real or apparent, for another eight years, What was done reaffirmed once more the nature of the revolution and of its directing force and Talmudic purpose.
THE ZIONIST STATE
pages 423 - 469
The revolution, having spread
into the half of Europe held clear for it by the Western Allies, did one
more thing: in the manner of a serpent striking, it thrust out a tongue
that reached to the southern shores of Europe, across the Mediterranean and
into the tiny land called Palestine.
The money, equipment, escort
and convoy were provided by the West, but the revolution supplied the two
indispensable constituents of the Zionist State: the
people to invade it and the arms which made its conquest
certain.
The West connived, but the
Zionist state in the last analysis was the creation of the revolution, which
in this manner fulfilled the Levitical doctrine of "the return".
These incursions into Europe
and into Arabia were the sole "territorial gains" reaped from the Second
War, in the early stages of which the Western "premier-dictators" for a second
time had publicly renounced all thought of territorial gain.
The result of these two
developments was to leave, in bisected Europe and bisected Palestine, two
permanent detonation points of new war, which at any moment could be set
off by any who might think to further their ambitions by a third
war.
The reader will recall that
in the years preceding the Second War, Zionism was in collapse in Palestine;
and that the British Parliament in 1939, having been forced by twenty years
of experience to realize that the "Jewish National Home" was impossible to
realize, had decided to abandon the unworkable "Mandate" and to withdraw
after ensuring the parliamentary representation of all parties
in the land, Arab, Jews and others.
The reader then beheld the
change which came about when Mr. Churchill became Prime Minister in 1940
and privately informed Dr. Weizmann (according to Dr. Weizmann's account,
which has not been challenged) that he "quite agreed" with the Zionist ambition
"after the war. . . to build up a state of three or four million Jews in
Palestine".
Mr. Churchill always expressed
great respect for parliamentary government but in this case, as a wartime
potentate, he privily and arbitrarily overrode a policy approved, after full
debate, by the House of Commons.
After that, the reader followed
Dr. Weizmann in his journeys to America and saw how Mr. Churchill's efforts
"to arm the Jews" (in which he was opposed by the responsible administrators
on the spot) received support from there under the "pressure" of Dr. Weizmann
and his associates.
That was the point at which
the reader last saw the Zionist state in gestation. Throughout 1944,
as Mr. Churchill records in his war memoirs, he continued to press the Zionist
ambition.
"It is well known I am determined not to break the pledges of the British Government to the Zionists expressed in the Balfour Declaration , as modified by my subsequent statement at the Colonial Office in 1921, No change can be made in policy without full discussion in Cabinet". (June 23, 1944).
The policy
had been changed after full discussion in Cabinet and Parliament,
in 1939. Here Mr. Churchill simply ignored that major decision on policy
and reverted to the earlier one, echoing the strange words of another Colonial
Secretary (Mr. Leopold Amery, earlier quoted) that this policy could
not change.
Again,
"There is no doubt that this (treatment of Jews in Hungary) is probably the greatest and most horrible crime ever committed in the whole history of the world. . ."all concerned in this crime who may fall into our hands, including the people who only obeyed orders by carrying out the butcheries, should be put to death after their association with the murders has been proved.. ."Declarations should be made in public, so that everyone connected with it will be hunted down and put to death" (July 11, 1944).
Here Mr. Churchill, like President
Roosevelt and Mr. Eden, implicitly links the execution of captives
solely with their crimes against Jews, thus relegating all
other sufferers to the oblivion into which, in fact, they fell.
Incidentally, the reader saw in the last chapter that Jews were among
the tormentors, as well as among the victims.
To continue:
"I am anxious to reply promptly to Dr. Weizmann's request for the formation of a Jewish fighting force put forward in his letter of July 4th (July 12, 1944). I like the idea of the Jews trying to get at the murders of their fellow-countrymen in Central Europe and I think it would give a great deal of satisfaction in the United States. I believe it is the wish of the Jews themselves to fight the Germans everywhere. It is with the Germans they have their quarrel". (July 26th, 1944).
If Mr. Churchill, as stated
by Dr. Weizmann, had agreed to the building up "of a state of three or four
million Jews in Palestine", he must have known that the Zionists had a much
larger quarrel with the population of Arabia, and that any "Jewish fighting
force" would be more likely to fall on these innocent third parties than
on the Germans.
Mr. Churchill's last recorded
allusion (as wartime prime minister) came after the fighting in Europe
ended:
"The whole question of Palestine must be settled at the peace table. . . I do not think we should take the responsibility upon ourselves of managing this very difficult place while the Americans sit back and criticise."Have you ever addressed yourselves to the idea that we should ask them to take it over?. . . I am not aware of the slightest advantage which has ever accrued to Great Britain from this painful and thankless task. Somebody else should have their turn now". (July 6, 1945)
This passage (considered together
with President Roosevelt's jocular remark to Stalin, that the only concession
he might offer King Ibn Saoud would be "to give him the six million Jews
in the United States") reveal the private thoughts of these premier-dictators
who so docilely did the bidding of Zion.
Mr. Churchill wished he could
shift the insoluble problem to the American back: Mr. Roosevelt would gladly
have shifted it on to some other back. In this matter the great men,
as an unwary remark in each case shows, behaved like the comedian who cannot
by any exertion divest himself of the gluey flypaper.
Mr. Churchill, in this
inter-office memorandum, was not aware "of the slightest advantage that has
ever accrued to Great Britain from this painful and thankless task". But
in public, when Zion was listening, he continued (and to the moment
of writing this book continues) to applaud the Zionist adventure in a boundless
manner which aroused the curiosity even of Jewish critics (as will be
seen).
At the time when Mr. Churchill
dictated this last memorandum his words about "settling the question of Palestine
at the peace table" were so irrelevant that he might have had humorous intent
in using them. The issue was closed, for the Zionists had arms, the men to
use these arms were to be smuggled through Europe from the revolutionary
area by the West (as shown in the last chapter), and both major political
parties in England and America were ready to applaud any act of aggression,
invasion or persecution the transmigrants committed with the arms they had
obtained.
This was particularly evident
in the case of the Socialist party in England, which at that time was still
the country chiefly involved in the fate of Palestine. The Labour party
(as it called itself) in England presented itself as the champion of the
poor, defenceless and oppressed; it had been born and bred in the promise
of old-age pensions, unemployment relief, free medicine and the care and
relief of the destitute, poor or humble generally.
As the war drew towards its
end this party at long last saw before it the prospect of office with a
substantial majority. Like the Conservative party (and both parties
in America) it apparently calculated that victory was even at this stage
not quite certain and that it could be ensured by placating Zion. Thus
it placed at the head of its foreign policy the aim to drive from a little
country far away some people who were poorer, more friendless and longer
oppressed than even the British worker in the worst days of the Industrial
Revolution.
In 1944 its leader, Mr. Clement
Attlee, proclaimed the new, crowning tenet of British Socialism:
"Let the Arabs be encouraged to move out (of Palestine) as the Jews move in. Let them be handsomely compensated for their land, and their settlement elsewhere be carefully organized and generously financed".
(Twelve years later nearly a million of these
people, encouraged to move out by bombs, still languished in the neighbour
Arab countries of Palestine, and the British Socialist Party, at every new
turn of events, was more claimant than ever for their further
chastisement).
The British Socialists, when
they made this statement, knew that the Zionists, under cover of the war
against Germany, had amassed arms for the conquest of Palestine by
force.
General Wavell, the commander
in the Middle East, had long before informed Mr. Churchill that "left to
themselves, the Jews would beat the Arabs" (who had no source of arms-supply).
General Wavell's view about the Zionist scheme was that of all responsible
administrators on the spot, and for that reason he was disliked
by Dr. Weizmann.
The reader has already seen,
as far back as the First War, that Dr. Weizmann's displeasure was dangerous
even to high personages and it may have played a part in General Wavell's
removal from the Middle East command to India.
The official British
History of the War in the Middle East describes General Wavell
as "one of the great commanders in military history" and says tiredness,
caused by his great responsibilities, was aggravated by the feeling that
he did not enjoy the full confidence of Mr. Churchill, who bombarded his
Middle East commander with "irritating" and "needless" telegrams about "matters
of detail". By his relegation General Wavell may have been another
victim of Zionism, and British military prowess have suffered accordingly
in the war; this cannot be established but it is a reasonable
surmise.
In 1944 assassination again
appeared in the story. Lord Moyne, as Colonial Secretary, was the Cabinet
minister then responsible for Palestine, the post earlier held by Lord Lloyd
(who had been rudely rebuked by Mr. Churchill for tardiness in "arming the
Jews" and had died in 1941). Lord Moyne was the friend of all men,
and sympathetic to Judaism, but he shared the view of all his responsible
predecessors, that the Zionist enterprise in Palestine would end
disastrously.
For that reason, and having
sympathy for suffering mankind in general, he was inclined to revive the
idea of proving land in Uganda for any Jews who truly needed to find a new
home somewhere.
This humane notion brought
him the mortal hatred of the Zionists, who would not brook any diversion
of thought from the target of their ambition: Palestine. In 1943 Lord
Moyne modified his view, according to Mr. Churchill, who suggested that Dr.
Weizmann should go to Cairo, meet Lord Moyne there and satisfy himself of
the improvement.
Before any meeting could come
about, Lord Moyne was assassinated in Cairo (November 1944) by two Zionists
from Palestine, one more peacemaker thus being removed from a path strewn
with the bones of earlier pacifiers.
This event for a moment disturbed
the flow of Mr. Churchill's memoranda to his colleagues about "arming the
Jews", and the responsible men in Palestine once again urgently recommended
that Zionist immigration thither be suspended. Mr. Churchill's reply
(November 17, 1944) was that this would "simply play into the hands of the
extremists", whereon the extremists were left unhindered in their further
plans and their tribe increased.
As the Second War approached
its end in Europe Mr. Churchill's hopes of some spectacular transaction which
would happily integrate the Chazars in Arabia faded.
If his suggestion (that Ibn
Saoud be made "lord of the Middle East, provided he settles with you", i.e.
Dr. Weizmann) was ever conveyed by Dr. Weizmann to President Roosevelt, an
episode of 1944 may have been the result of it.
An American, Colonel Hoskins,
("President Roosevelt's personal representative in the Middle East"; according
to Dr. Weizmann) then visited the Arab leader. Colonel Hoskins, like
all qualified men, had no faith in the plan to set up a Zionist state but
was in favour of helping Jews to go to Palestine (if any so wished) in agreement
with the Arabs. He found that King Ibn Saoud held himself to have been
grossly insulted by Dr. Weizmann of whom he spoke "in the angriest and most
contemptuous manner, asserting that I (Dr. Weizmann) had tried to bribe him
with twenty million pounds to sell out Palestine to the Jews", and he indignantly
rejected any suggestion of a deal on such terms.
Therewith all prospect of
any "settlement" vanished and Colonel Hoskins also passed from the story,
another good man defeated in his attempt to solve the insoluble problem posed
by Mr. Balfour.
Thus, as the war entered its
last months, only two alternatives remained. The British Government,
abandoning the decision of 1939, could struggle on, trying to hold the scales
impartially between the native inhabitants and their besiegers from Russia;
or it could throw up "the Mandate" and withdraw, whereupon the Zionists would
expel the native inhabitants with arms procured from the European and African
theatres of war.
This second great moment in
the Palestinian drama approached. Mr. Roosevelt had been told by Dr. Weizmann
that the Zionists "could not rest the case on the consent of the Arabs" but
had remained non-committal. Mr. Churchill, according to Dr. Weizmann,
had committed himself, in private, and in 1944 Dr. Weizmann
grew impatient to have from Mr. Churchill a public committal in the form
of an amended Balfour Declaration which would award
territory (in place of the meaningless phrase "a national home")
to Zion (in 1949 he was still very angry that Mr. Churchill, on the "pretext"
that the war must first be finished, refrained from making this final public
capitulation).
Like Macbeth, Dr. Weizmann's
"top-line politicians" flinched and shrunk as the moment for the deed approached.
Neither Mr. Churchill nor Mr. Roosevelt would openly command their
soldiers to do it and the Zionists furiously cried "Infirm of
purpose!"
Then, Mr. Roosevelt went to
Yalta, wearing the visage of doomed despair which the news-reel pictures
recorded, arranged for the bisection of Europe, and at the end briefly informed
Mr. Churchill (who was "flabbergasted" and "greatly disturbed" by the news,
according to Mr. Hopkins) that he was going to meet King Ibn Saoud on board
the U.S. cruiser Quincy.
What followed remains deeply
mysterious. Neither Mr. Roosevelt nor Mr. Churchill had any right to bestow
Arab land on the lobbyists who beleaguered them in Washington and London;
nevertheless, what was demanded of them was, in appearance, so small in
comparison with what had just been done at Yalta, that Mr. Roosevelt's submission
and some harsh ultimatum to Kin Ibn Saoud would have surprised none. Instead,
he suddenly stepped out of the part he had played for many years and spoke
as a statesman; after that he died.
He left Yalta on February
11, 1945, and spent February 12, 13 and 14 aboard the Quincy, receiving King
Ibn Saoud during this time. He asked the king "to admit some more Jews in
to Palestine" and received the blunt answer, "NO". Ibn Saoud said that "there
was a Palestine army of Jews all armed to the teeth and. . . they did not
seem to be fighting the Germans but were aiming at the Arabs".
On February 28 Mr. Roosevelt
returned to Washington. On March 28 Ibn Saoud reiterated by letter his verbal
warning (since confirmed by events) of the consequences which would follow
from American support of the Zionists. On April 5 President Roosevelt replied
reaffirming his own pledge verbally given to Ibn Saoud that:
"I would take no action, in my capacity as Chief of the Executive Branch of this Government which might prove hostile to the Arab people".
On April 12 he died. This
pledge would never have become known but for the action of an American statesman,
Secretary of State James G. Byrnes, who published it six months later (October
18, 1945) in a vain attempt to deter Mr. Roosevelt's successor, President
Truman, from taking the very "action hostile to the Arabs" which President
Roosevelt swore he would never commit.
Mr. Roosevelt's pledge was
virtually a deathbed one, and another of history's great unanswered questions
is, did he mean it? If by any chance he did, then once more death intervened
as the ally of Zionism. His intimate Mr. Harry Hopkins (who was present at
the meeting and drafted a memorandum about it) sneered at the suggestion
that it might have been sincerely intended, saying that President Roosevelt
was "wholly committed publicly and privately and by conviction"
to the Zionists.
(This memorandum records Mr.
Roosevelt's statement that he had learned more from Ibn Saoud about Palestine
in five minutes than he had previously learned in a lifetime; out of this,
again, grew the famous anecdote that Ibn Saoud said, "We have known
for two thousand years what you have fought two world wars to
learn".
However, Mr. Hopkins may
conceivably not be a trustworthy witness on this one occasion, for immediately
after the meeting he, the president's shadow, mysteriously broke with Mr.
Roosevelt, whom he never saw again!
Mr. Hopkins shut himself in
his cabin and three days later, at Algiers, went ashore, "sending word" through
an intermediary that he would return to America by another route.
The breach was as sudden as
that between Mr. Wilson and Mr. House.
What is clear is that the
last few weeks and days of Mr. Roosevelt's life were overshadowed by the
controversy of Zion, not by American or European questions. Had he lived,
and his pledge to Ibn Saoud become known, Zionism, which so powerfully helped
to make and maintain him president for twelve years, would have become his
bitter enemy. He died.
(The pledge was
categorical: it continued, "no decision will be taken with
regard to the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation
with both Arabs and Jews"; this was direct repudiation of Dr. Weizmann,
who had told him, "we could not rest the case on Arab consent".)
Thus, cloaked in a last-moment
mystery, Mr. Roosevelt too passed from the story. A parting glimpse of the
throng which had gathered round him during his twelve-year reign is given
by the senior White House correspondent, Mr. Merriman Smith; this description
of a wake shows that the carousing of Yalta accompanied the president even
to his grave:
"Most of the people on the train were members of the Roosevelt staff. Before the train was out of sight of the crepe-hung Hyde Park depot, they started what turned out to be a post-funeral wake. Liquor flowed in every compartment and drawing-room. The shades were drawn throughout the train and from the outside it looked like any train bearing mourners home. But behind those curtains, the Roosevelt staff had what they thought was a good time. Their Boss would have approved. . ."I saw one of the top New Dealers hurl a tray of empty glasses into a toilet and shout in mock bravado, "Down the hatch, we won't need you any more'. Porters and club stewards bustled up and down the corridors with gurgling, sloshing trays. If you hadn't known the people in the drawing room, you would have thought they were on their way home from a football game. Some of the people were using whisky as an antidote for worry over their jobs. . ."I could hear an alcoholic chorus of Auld Lang Syne. . . "
Such were the trappings of statesmanship, during
those last days when "the boys" toiled towards another "victory", when the
Communist armies seized half of Europe, and the Zionists from Russia were
convoyed by the West towards the invasion of Palestine.
In this question of Palestine,
Mr. Roosevelt was liberated from his dilemma by death. Mr. Churchill was
left to face his. He had courted Zionist favour from the days of the 1906
election. He had been a member of the British Government in 1917, of which
another member (Mr. Leopold Amery, quoted in a Zionist paper in 1952)
said,
"We thought when we issued the Balfour Declaration that if the Jews could become a majority in Palestine they would form a Jewish state. . . We encouraged not a divided Palestine, which exists only west of the Jordan".
Mr. Churchill never publicly
stated any such intention (indeed, he denied it), but if it was his view
this means that even the Zionist state set up after the Second World War
by no means fulfills the intention of those who made the Balfour Declaration,
and that further conquests of Arab lands have yet to be made by
war.
The governing word in the
passage quoted is "if": "if the Jews could become a majority.
. ." By 1945 three decades of Arab revolt had shown that the Zionists never
would "become a majority" unless the Arabs were driven out
of their native land by arms. The question that remained was, who was to
drive them out? Mr. Roosevelt had sworn not to. Dr. Weizmann, ever quick
to cry "I stay here on my bond", liked to claim that Mr. Churchill was committed
as far as Dr. Weizmann wanted him to go.
Even Mr. Churchill could not
do this deed. He, too, then was liberated from his dilemma; not by death,
but by electoral defeat. His memoirs express wounded pride at this rebuff;
"All our enemies having surrendered unconditionally or being about to do
so, I was immediately dismissed by the British electorate from all further
conduct of their affairs".
It was not as simple as that.
The future historian has to work from such material, but the living participant
knows better, and I was in England and saw the election when Mr. Churchill
was "dismissed". In truth the British electorate could hardly have been expected
to see in the outcome of the war (of which Mr. Churchill is the bitterest
critic) cause for a vote of thanksgiving to Mr. Churchill, but there were
other reasons for his defeat than mere disillusionment.
As in American elections,
so in this British one of 1945 the power to "deliver the votes" was shown.
Mr. churchill had gone far in "arming the Jews" and in private committing
himself to Zionism, but not far enough for Dr. Weizmann. In England at the
mid-century, control of the press was virtually complete, in this question:
Zionist propaganda at the election turned solidly against Mr. Churchill and
was waged in behalf of the Socialists, who had given the requisite promise
of support for "hostile action" against the Arabs. ("The Arabs should be
encouraged to move out as the Jews move in. . .").
The block of Jewish Members
of Parliament swung over in a body to the Socialist party (and was strongest
in the left wing of it, where the Communists lurked). With high elation the
Zionist saw the discomfiture of their "champion" of 1906, 1917 and 1939.
Dr. Weizmann says that the Socialist victory (and Mr. churchill's "dismissal")
"delighted all liberal elements". This was the requital for Mr. Churchill's
forty years of support for Zionism; he had not actually ordered British troops
to clear Palestine of Arabs and, for a while, was an enemy.
Thus Mr. Churchill was at
least reprieved from the task of deciding what to do about Palestine and
should not have been so grieved as he depicts himself, when he was dismissed
soon after "victory".
The British Socialists, at
last provided with a great majority in parliament, then found at once that
they were expected by forcible measures to "encourage the Arabs to move out".
When they too shrank from the assassin's deed the cries of "betrayal" fell
about their ears like hailstones. Dr. Weizmann's narrative grows frantic
with indignation at this point; the Socialist government, he says, "within
three months of taking office repudiated the pledge so often
and clearly, even vehemently, repeated to the Jewish people".
During forty years Lord Curzon
seems to have been the only leading politician caught up in this affair to
realize that even the most casual word of sympathy, uttered to Dr. Weizmann,
would later be held up as "a pledge", solemnly given and infamously
broken.
Among the victorious Socialists
a worthy party-man, one Mr. Hall, inherited the Colonial Office from Lord
Lloyd, Lord Moyne and others dead or defamed, and was barely in it when a
deputation from the World Zionist Congress arrived:
"I must say the attitude adopted by the members of the deputation was different from anything which I have ever experienced. It was not a request for the consideration by His Majesty's Government of the decisions of the Zionist conference, but a demand that His Majesty's Government should do what the Zionist Organization desired them to do".
Ten years later an American
ex-president, Mr. Truman, recalled similar visits during his presidency in
similar terms of innocent surprise; in 1945 the thing had been going on since
1906 without disturbing Mr. Hall's political slumbers. Soon after this he
was ousted from the Colonial Office, his suitability for a peerage suddenly
being realized.
The Socialist government of
1945, which in domestic affairs must have been nearly the worst that a war-weary
country, in need of reinvigoration, could have received, in foreign affairs
did its country one service. It saved, of honour, what could be saved. Under
pressure from the four corners of the world it refused to play the assassin's
part in Palestine; if it did not protect the Arabs, and by that time it probably
could not protect them, at least it did not destroy them for the Zionist
taskmaster.
This achievement was the sole
work of a Mr. Ernest Bevin, in my estimation the greatest man produced in
British political life during this century. According to report, King George
VI, the most unobtrusive of monarchs, urged the incoming Socialist prime
minister, Mr. Attlee, to make his best and strongest man Foreign Secretary,
because the state of the world so clearly demanded this. Mr. Attlee thereon
revised a list already drafted, expunging the name of some worthy "liberal"
who might have involved his country in the coming pogrom of Arabs, and inserting
that of Mr. Bevin.
By 1945 Palestine was clearly
too big an issue for Colonial Secretaries to handle; it was, and will long
remain, the major preoccupation of Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries,
Presidents and Secretaries of State in England and America, because it is
the most inflammable source of new wars.
In 1945, as soon as "victory"
was won, it was seen to dominate and pervert the politics of all nation-states.
Without awe, Ernest Bevin, the farm lad from Somerset and the dockers' idol,
took up the bomb and sought to remove the fuse. Had he received support from
one leading man in any Western country he might have saved the day. They
all fell on him like wolves; there was something of the camp-meeting and
of revivalist hysteria in the abandon of their surrender to
Zionism.
He was a robust man, with
the beef and air of the West Country in his bones and muscle and its fearless
tradition in his blood, but even he was physically broken within a few years
by the fury of unremitting defamation. He was not spiritually daunted. He
realized that he had to do with an enterprise essentially conspiratorial,
a conspiracy of which the revolution and Zionism were linked parts, and he
may be unique among politicians of this century in that he used a word
("conspiracy") which has a dictionary meaning plainly applicable to this
case.
He bluntly told Dr. Weizmann
that he would not be coerced or coaxed into any action contrary to Britain's
undertakings. Dr. Weizmann had not experienced any such instruction, at that
high level, since 1904, and his indignation, surging outward from him through
the Zionist organizations of the world, produced the sustained abuse of Mr.
Bevin which then followed.
Mr. Churchill, had he remained
prime minister, would apparently have used British arms to enforce the partition
of Palestine. That seems to be the inescapable inference from his memorandum
to the Chiefs of Staff Committee (January 25, 1944), in which he said "the
Jews, left to themselves, would beat the Arabs; there cannot therefore be
any great danger in our joining hands with the Jews to enforce the
kind of proposals about partition which are set forth. . .
"
The reader may see how greatly
circumstances alter cases. The bisection of Europe was for
Mr. Churchill "a hideous partition, which cannot last". Partition in Palestine
was worthy to be enforced by "joining hands with the Jews".
Mr. Bevin would have no truck
with such schemes. Under his guidance the Socialist government announced
that it
"would not accept the view that the Jews should be driven out of Europe or that they should not be permitted to live again in these (European) countries without discrimination, contributing their ability and talent towards rebuilding the prosperity of Europe".
The words show that this man
understood the nature of Zionist chauvinism, the problem posed by it and
the only solution. They depict what will inevitably happen one day, but that
day has been put back to some time after another ruinous era in Palestine,
which will probably involve the world.
He was either the first British
politician fully to comprehend the matter, or the first to act with the courage
of his knowledge.
The Socialist government of
1945 was driven, by responsible office, to do what all responsible governments
before it had equally been forced to do; to send out one more commission
of enquiry (which could but repeat the reports of all earlier commissions)
and in the meantime to regulate Zionist immigration and to safeguard the
interest of the native Arabs, in accordance with the pledges of the original
Balfour Declaration.
Dr. Weizmann considered this
"a reversion to the old, shifty double emphasis on the
obligation towards the Arabs of Palestine" and the Zionist
power went to work to destroy Mr. Bevin on whose head, for the next two years,
a worldwide campaign was turned. It was concentric, synchronised and of
tremendous force.
First, the Conservative party
was sent into action. The Socialists had defeated them by capitulations to
Zionism, which brought them the help of the controlled press. The conservatives,
being out of office, played this trump card against the Socialists, and in
turn made their capitulations to Zion.
This was at once made clear:
the party proclaimed that it would combat the domestic and support the
foreign policy of the Socialists, but from the moment of the
Socialist declaration about Palestine it made one exception to the second
rule: it began a sustained attack on the Socialist government's policy
about Palestine, which meant, on Mr. Bevin.
At that point Mr. Churchill,
safe in opposition, demeaned himself by accusing Mr. Bevin of "anti-Jewish
feelings", a shot taken from the locker of the Anti-Defamation League (which
added a new epithet, "Bevinism", to its catalogue of
smearwords).
No such traducement of a political
adversary ever came from Mr. Bevin, Mr. Churchill's outstanding colleague
during the long war years.
Thus Mr. Bevin, at the post
of greatest danger, received the full support of the opposition party in
all matters of foreign policy save one: Palestine. He might yet have saved
the day but for the intervention of the new American president, Mr. Harry
S. Truman, with whose automatic elevation (on the death of the incumbent)
from the Vice-Presidency the story of the 20th Century resumed the aspect
of Greek tragedy (or of a comedy of errors).
Mr. Truman involved his country
up to the neck in the Palestinian imbroglio at the very moment when in England,
at long last, a man had arisen who was able and staunch enough to liquidate
the disastrous venture.
Unless a man has that genius
which needs no basis in acquired knowledge, a small town in the Middle West
and Kansas City are poor places for learning about world affairs. Mr. Truman,
when the presidency was thrust upon him, had two major disqualifications
for the office. One was native remoteness from world politics, and the other
was too close acquaintance with ward politics, of which he had seen
much.
In Kansas City he had watched
the machine at work; he knew about patronage, ward bosses and stuffed
ballot-boxes. He had received the impression that politics were business,
and essentially simple in the basic rules, which allowed no room for
high-falutin' ideas.
A middle-sized, hale,
broadly-smiling man who was to sign the order for an act of destruction
unprecedented in the history of the West, he strode briskly on to the stage
of great events. He decided at Potsdam that "Uncle Joe" was "a nice guy"
and there completed Mr. Roosevelt's territorial rearrangements in Europe
and Asia. He arranged for the atom-bombing of defenceless Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
No comparable series of acts ever fell to the lot of a once-bankrupt haberdasher
precipitated into the office of a "premier-dictator". Then he turned his
gaze on domestic affairs and the next Congressional and presidential elections.
In these, he knew (and said), the Zionist-controlled vote was
decisive.
While Mr. Bevin strove to
undo the tangle, Mr. Truman undid Mr. Bevin's efforts. He demanded
that a hundred thousand Jews be admitted immediately to Palestine, and he
arranged for the first partisan commission of enquiry to go
to Palestine. This was the only means by which any commission could ever
be expected to produce a report favourable to the Zionist scheme. Two of
its four American members were avowed Zionists; the one British member was
Zionist propagandist and a left-wing enemy of Mr. Bevin.
This "Anglo-American Commission"
went to Palestine, where Dr. Weizmann (for perhaps the tenth time in some
thirty years) was the chief personage heard. It recommended (though "cautiously")
the admission of one hundred thousand "displaced persons" (the term was
presumably meant to mislead the public masses and was at the moment of some
importance; no truly displaced persons wanted to go to
Palestine).
Therewith the fat of the next
war was in the fire, and an American president publicly supported "hostile
action" against the Arabs, for it was that. The next Zionist Congress (at
Geneva in 1946) joyfully recorded this new "pledge" (Mr. Truman's "suggestion"
and the partisan commission's "cautious recommendations"). This was a
characteristic Zionist Congress, being composed chiefly of Jews from Palestine
(who had already migrated there) and from America (who had no intention of
going there); the herded-mass, to be transported thither, was not represented.
Dr. Weizmann's description of the decisions taken are of great
significance.
He says the congress "had
a special character" and showed "a tendency to rely on methods. . . referred
to by different names: "resistance', 'defence', 'activism'."
Despite these "shades of meaning"
(he says) "one feature was common to all of them: the conviction of the need
for fighting against British authority in Palestine, or anywhere
else, for that matter".
Dr. Weizmann's guarded remarks
must be considered in the context of his whole book and of the entire history
of Zionism.
What he means is that the
Zionist World Congress at Geneva in 1946 decided to resume the method of
terror and assassination which had proved effective in Russia in the
germinating-stage of the two-headed conspiracy. The congress knew this to
be the method "referred to by different names" during its discussions, for
it had already been resumed in the assassination of Lord Moyne
and many terrorist exploits in Palestine.
The prompting impulse for
the Congress's decision (which in fact it was) came from the American president's
recommendation that a hundred thousand people should be forcibly injected
into Palestine. The Zionists took that to be another "pledge", committing
America to approval of anything they might do, and they were
right.
Dr. Weizmann knew exactly
what was at stake and in his old age shrank from the prospect that reopened
before him:
reversion to the worship of Moloch, the god of blood.
He had seen so much blood
shed in the name of revolutionary-Communism and revolutionary-Zionism, the
two causes which had dominated his parental home and home town in the Pale.
In his youth he had exulted in the riots and revolutions and had found
the assassinations a natural part of the process; in his maturity he had
rejoiced in the ruin of Russia despite the decades of bloodshed which ensued.
For fifty-five years he had
cried havoc and unloosed dogs of war. Almost unknown to the masses embroiled
in two wars, he had become one of the most powerful men in the world. Beginning
in 1906, when he first wheedled Mr. Balfour, he had gradually risen until
his word in the lobbies was law, when he could command audience of monarchs
and obedience of presidents and prime ministers. Now, when the enterprise
he had so long schemed for was on the brink of consummation, he recoiled
from the bloodstained prospect that opened immeasurably before him; blood,
and more blood, and at the end. . . what? Dr. Weizmann remembered Sabbata
Zevi.
He was against "trucking to
the demoralizing forces in the movement", the cryptic phrase he uses to cover
those referred to by Mr. Churchill as "the extremists", and by the administrators
on the spot as "the terrorists". This meant that he had changed as his end
approached, for without terrorism Zionism would never have established itself
at all and if, in 1946, his Zionist state was to be achieved, this could
only be done by violence.
Thus at the last Dr. Weizmann
realized the futility of his half-century of "pressure behind the scenes"
and no doubt saw the inevitable fiasco that lay ahead, after the Zionist
state had been born in terror.
Psychologically, this was
a moment of great interest in the story. Perhaps men grow wise in their old
age; they tire of the violent words and deeds which seemed to solve all problems
in their conspiratorial youth, and this revulsion may have overtaken Chaim
Weizmann. If it did, it was too late to alter anything. The machine he had
built had to continue, of its own momentum, to its own destruction and that
of any in its path. The remaining future of Zionism was in the hands of "the
demoralizing forces in the movement", and he had put it there.
He was denied a vote of confidence
and was not re-elected president of the World Zionist Organization.
Forty years after Herzl, he
was cast aside as he had cast Herzl aside, and for the same essential reason.
He and his Chazars from Russia had overthrown Herzl because Herzl wanted
to accept Uganda, which meant renouncing Palestine. He was overthrown because
he feared to re-embark on the policy of terror and assassination, and that
also meant renouncing Palestine.
The note of despair sounded
even earlier, in his allusions to Lord Moyne's murder:
"Palestine Jewry will. . . cut out, root and branch, this evil from its midst. . . this utterly un-Jewish phenomenon".
These words were addressed
to Western ears and were specious; political murder was not "an utterly un-Jewish
phenomenon" in the Talmudic areas of Russia where Dr. Weizmann spent his
revolutionary and conspiratorial youth, as he well knew, and a series of
similar deeds stained the past. Indeed, when he spoke to a
Zionist audience he candidly admitted that political murder
was not an "utterly un-Jewish phenomenon" but the opposite:
"What was the terror in Palestine but the old evil in a new and horrible guise".
This "old evil", rising from
its Talmudic bottle to confront Dr. Weizmann at Geneva in 1946, apparently
accounts for the note of premonition which runs through the last pages of
his book of 1949 (when the Zionist state had been set up by
terror).
The Moyne murder, he then
forebodingly said, "illumines the abyss into which terrorism leads". Thus
in his last days Dr. Weizmann saw whither his indefatigable journey had led:
to an abyss! He lived to see it receive a first batch of nearly a million
victims. From the moment of his deposition effective control passed into
the hands of "the terrorists", as he calls them, and his belated cry of "Back!"
fell on empty air.
The "activists" (as they prefer
to call themselves) were left with power to ignite a third world conflict
when they pleased. Dr. Weizmann survived to play a determining part in the
next stage of the venture but never again had true power in
Zionism.
From 1946 the terrorists took
command. They set to work to drive the British from Palestine first, and
knew they could not fail in the state of affairs which had been brought about
during the Second War. If the British defended either themselves or the semitic
Arabs the cry of "anti-semitism" would rise until the politicians in Washington
turned on the British; then, when the British left, the terrorists would
drive out the Arabs.
The terror had been going
on for many years, the Moyne murder being only one incident in it; indeed,
one of the harassed Colonial Secretaries, Mr. Oliver Stanley, in 1944 told
the House of Commons that it had sensibly impeded "the British war effort",
or in other words, prolonged the war (he is a trustworthy witness, for he
was hailed by the Zionists at his death as "a staunch friend").
In 1946 and 1947, after the
Geneva Congress, it was intensified, hundreds of British soldiers being ambushed,
shot while asleep, blown up and the like. The terror was deliberately given
the visible appearance of "the old evil" when two British sergeants were
slowly done to death in an orchard and left hanging there. The choice of
this Levitical form of butchery ("hanging on a tree", the death "accursed
of God") signified that these things were done under the Judaic
Law.
The British government, daunted
by the fury of the American and British press, under common constraint, feared
to protect its officials and soldiers, and one British soldier wrote to
The Times:
"What use has the army for the government's sympathy? It does not avenge those who are murdered, nor does it prevent any further killings. Are we no longer a nation with sufficient courage to enforce law and order where it is our responsibility to do so?"
This was the case. The great
Western governments had fallen, under "irresistible pressure", into a nerveless
captivity, and Britain and America had ceased, anyway for the time, to be
sovereign nations. At length the British government, in despair, referred
the problem of Palestine to the new organization in New York called "the
United Nations" (which had as little right to dispose of Palestine as the
League of Nations before it).
Delegates from Haiti, Liberia,
Honduras and other parts of "the free world" thronged to Lake Success, a
forlorn suburban pond outside New York. There was an hissing in the world
at this time and from the parent UNO bodies called COBSRA, UNRRA, UNESCO
uncoiled. On this particular day something called UNSCOP (United Nations
Special Committee on Palestine) rendered to UNO its report recommending "the
partition of Palestine".
Dr. Weizmann (though deposed
by the Zionist Organization for his warnings against terrorism) was once
more the chief authority heard by UNSCOP in Jerusalem, and then quickly returned
to New York where, in October and November of 1947, he dominated the hidden
scene as lobbyist supreme.
"Irresistible pressure" operated
with relentless force. The delegates whom the public masses saw on
the moving-picture screens were puppets; the great play was all behind the
curtain and in that, Chesterton's "real world", of which the multitude saw
nothing, two great operations were in progress, by means of which the fate
of Palestine was settled far from the debating halls of the United
Nations.
First, hundreds of thousands
of Jews from Russia and Eastern Europe were being smuggled across Western
Europe to invade Palestine. Second, the approach of an American presidential
election was being used by the Zionists as a means to set the rival parties
there bidding against each other for Zionist support, and thus to ensure
that the decisive American vote in the United Nations would be cast for the
invasion.
In each case, and as in the
preceding three decades, men arose who strove to disentangle their countries
from its consequences. The secret convoying of the Eastern Jews across Western
Europe was revealed by a British general, Sir Frederick Morgan (to whose
work in planning the invasion of Normandy General Eisenhower's book pays
tribute).
When the fighting ended General
Morgan was lent by the British War Office to "UNRRA", the offspring-body
of the United Nations which was supposed to "relieve and rehabilitate" the
sufferers from the war. General Morgan was put in charge of the most hapless
of these (the "displaced persons") and found that "UNRRA", which cost the
American and British taxpayer much money, was being used as an umbrella to
cover the mass-movement of Jews from the eastern area to Palestine.
These people were not "displaced
persons". Their native countries had been "liberated" by the Red Armies and
they were able to live in them, their welfare ensured by the special law
against "Anti-semitism" which all these communized countries received from
their Communist overlord. They had not been "driven from Germany", where
they had never lived. In fact, these were, once more, the Ostjuden, the Chazars,
being driven by their Talmudic masters to a new land for a conspiratorial
purpose.
In this way a new war was
being cooked over the embers of the dying one and General Morgan twice (in
January and August 1946) publicly stated that "a secret organization existed
to further a mass movement of Jews from Europe, a second Exodus". Senator
Herbert Lehman, a prominent Zionist who was Director General of UNRRA, said
this warning was "anti-semitic" and demanded General Morgan's resignation.
He relented when General Morgan
disclaimed "anti-semitic" intent, but when the general repeated his warning
eight months later he was summarily dismissed by the new Director
General, a Zionist sympathizer and former Mayor of New York, Mr. Fiorello
La Guardia, known to New Yorkers as The Little Flower. Mr. La Guardia then
appointed a Mr. Myer Cohen in General Morgan's place. The British government
hastened to punish General Morgan by retiring the celebrated invasion-planner,
stating (falsely) that this was at his request.
Two independent bodies of
high status confirmed General Morgan's information; in the servient condition
of the press their disclosure received little publicity. A Select Committee
on Estimates of the British House of Commons reported (November 1946)
that
"very large numbers of Jews, almost amounting to a second Exodus, have been migrating from Eastern Europe to the American zones of Germany and Austria with the intention in the majority of cases of finally making their way to Palestine. It is clear that it is a highly organized movement with ample funds and great influence behind it, but the Subcommittee were unable to obtain any real evidence who are the real instigators".
A War Investigating Committee
sent to Europe by the United States Senate said that
"heavy migration of Jews from Eastern Europe into the American zone of Germany is part of a carefully organized plan financed by special groups in the United States".
The picture, once again, is
of a conspiracy supported by the Western governments, in this case the American
one in particular. The "organization" in America disposed of American and
British public funds lavishly, and effected the mass-transfer of population
under the cloak of war-relief. Its leaders were able summarily to dismiss
high officials, publicly-paid, who exposed what went on, and the British
government supported this action.
Although by that time (1946-1947)
the perfidy of the revolutionary state was supposed to have been realized
by the Western politicians (so that "cold war" was waged with it), the three
governments of Washington, London and Moscow acted in perfect accord in this
one matter. The "exodus" came from Russia and from the part of Europe abandoned
by the West to the revolution.
No man may leave the Soviet
state without permission, most rarely granted, but in this case the Iron
Curtain opened to release a mass of people, just large enough to ensure immediate
war and permanent unrest in the Near East. Just as smoothly, thirty
years before, the frontiers and ports of Germany (an enemy), England (an
ally) and America (a neutral) had opened to allow the revolutionaries to
go to Russia. On both occasions, at this supreme level of policy, the
super-national one, there were no allies, enemies or neutrals; all governments
did the bidding of the supreme power.
One of the British Colonial Secretaries
earlier involved in Zionism and the Balfour Declaration of 1917, Mr. Leopold
Amery, had said:
"We thought when we issued the Balfour Declaration that if the Jews could become a majority in Palestine they would form a Jewish state".
In 1946-1948, at last, this
though was being realized, in the only way possible: by the mass-transplantation
of Eastern Jews to Palestine. Only one thing still was needed: to obtain
from "the United Nations" some act of mock-legalization for the invasion
about to occur. To ensure that, the capitulation of the American president
was necessary; and the way to bring that about was to threaten his party-advisers
with the loss of the approaching presidential elections, which lay a year
ahead.
A third war was in truth being
hatched, in the thinning fog of the second war, by this clandestine movement
of population, and in America (after the dismissal of General Morgan in Europe)
the two men whose offices made them directly responsible tried to nip the
peril in the bud (One was General Marshall, whose intervention in the question
of invading Europe and later in that of China have been shown by their
consequences to have been most ill-omened.
In the question of Palestine
he showed prudence. In 1947 he was Secretary of State and was thus chiefly
responsible, under the president, for foreign policy. He strove to ward off
his country's involvement in the Palestinian fiasco and, as in all such cases,
his relegation soon followed.
The other man was Mr. James
Forrestal, Secretary for Defence. He was a successful banker, brought
into government in wartime for his executive ability; he was wealthy and
only the impulse to serve his country can have moved him to take office.
He foresaw disastrous consequences from involvement and died believing he
had utterly failed in his effort to avert it. Of all the men concerned during
two generations, he alone left a diary which fully exposes the methods by
which Zion controls and manipulates governors and governments.
Mr. Truman went further than
even President Roosevelt in taking foreign policy and national security out
of the province of the responsible ministers, and in acting contrary to their
counsel under the pressure applied through electoral advisers. The story
is made complete by Mr. Forrestal's Diary, Mr. Truman's own memoirs, and
Dr. Weizmann's book.
The struggle behind the scenes
for control over the American president, and therewith of the Republic itself,
lasted from the autumn of 1947 to the spring of 1948, that is, from the United
Nations debate about the partition of Palestine to the proclamation of the
Zionist state after its forcible seizure.
Dates are important. In November
1947, the Zionists wanted the "partition" vote and in May 1948 they wanted
recognition of their invasion. The presidential election was due in November
1948, and the essential preliminary to it, the nomination contests, in June
and July 1948. The party-managers instructed Mr. Truman that re-election
was in the Zionist gift, the opposition candidate received similar advice
from his party managers.
Thus the election campaign
took on the nature of an auction, each candidate being constantly under pressure
from his organizers to outbid the other in supporting the invasion of Palestine.
In these circumstances the successful candidate could only feel that election
was a reward for "supporting partition" in November 1947 and "granting
recognition" in May 1948.
Nothing could more clearly
illustrate the vast change which the mass-immigration of Eastern Jews, in
the period following the Civil War, had brought about in the affairs of the
American Republic.
Mr. Forrestal left a full
account of the chief moves in this fateful, hidden contest.
The time-bomb planted by Mr.
Balfour thirty years earlier reached its explosion-moment when the British
government in 1947 announced that it would withdraw from Palestine if other
powers made impartial administrations there impossible; this was the reply
to President Truman's proposal that 100,000 "displaced persons" be allowed
to enter Palestine immediately.
Mr. Truman's responsible advisers
at once informed the American government of the consequences which would
flow from a British withdrawal. General Marshall told the American Cabinet
that such a British withdrawal "would be followed by a bloody struggle between
the Arabs and Jews" (August 8, 1947), and his Under Secretary of State, Mr.
Robert Lovett, pointed to the danger of "solidifying sentiment among all
the Arabian and Mohammedan peoples" against the United States (August 15,
1947).
This warning was at once answered
by the voice of party-politics. At a Cabinet lunch Mr. Robert Hannegan
(Postmaster General, but previously national chairman of the President's
party, the Democratic Party) urged the President to "make a statement of
policy on Palestine" demanding "the admission of 150,000 Zionists".
Thus the party-man's counsel
was that President Truman should respond to the British warning by increasing
his bid for Zionist electoral support, from 100,000 to 150,000 persons. Mr.
Hannegan said this new demand
"would have a very great influence and great effect on the raising of funds for the Democratic National Committee"
and, as proof of what he promised, added that
the earlier demand (related to 100,000 immigrants) had produced the result
that
"very large sums were obtained from Jewish contributors and they would be influenced in either giving or withholding by what the President did on Palestine".
Thus the issue from the outset
was presented to the President in the plainest terms of national interest
on the one hand and party-contributions, party-votes and party-success on
the other. It was argued throughout the months that followed and finally
determined on that basis, without any gloss.
Mr. Forrestal's alarm became
acute. He held that if state policy and national security (his province)
were to be subordinated to vote-buying the country would pass under Zionist
control and earlier (in 1946) had asked the President if Palestine could
not be "taken out of politics". Mr. Truman at that time had "agreed about
the principle" but evinced the feeling "that not much will come of such an
attempt, that political manoeuvring is inevitable, politics and our
government being what they are".
In September 1947, Mr. Forrestal
spurred by his misgivings, laboured tirelessly to have Palestine "taken out
of politics". His idea was that both contending parties must contain a majority
of people who could be brought to agree, in the paramount national interest,
that major foreign issues be set above dispute, so that Palestine could not
be used for huckstering at election-time. He found only disdain for
this idea among the men of "practical politics".
Deeply disturbed by Mr. Hannegan's
above-quoted remarks of September 4, Mr. Forrestal at a Cabinet lunch on
September 29, 1947 openly asked President Truman "whether it would not be
possible to lift the Jewish-Palestine question out of politics". Mr. Truman
said "it was worth trying to do, although he was obviously skeptical". At
the next Cabinet lunch (October 6) the party-boss rebuked the responsible
Cabinet officer.
"Mr. Hannegan brought up the question of Palestine. He said many people who had contributed to the Democratic campaign were pressing hard for assurances from the administration of definitive support for the Jewish position in Palestine".
Mr. Forrestal foresaw Mr.
Truman's capitulation and his alarm increased. He saw the Democratic
party-manager, Mr. J. Howard McGrath (November 6, 1947) and again could make
no headway. Mr. McGrath said:
"There were two or three pivotal states which could not be carried without the support of people who were deeply interested in the Palestine question".
The next day he again received
support from General Marshall, who told the Cabinet that the Middle East
was "another tinder box", and Mr. Forrestal then
"repeated my suggestion. . . that a serious attempt be made to lift the Palestine question out of American partisan politics. . . Domestic politics ceased at the Atlantic Ocean and no question was more charged with danger to our security than this particular one" (November 7, 1947).
The "partition" vote was by
this time near and Mr. Forrestal made another appeal to Mr. McGrath, the
Democratic party-manager, showing him a secret report on Palestine provided
by the governmental intelligence agency.
Mr. McGrath brushed this aside,
saying Jewish sources were responsible for a substantial part of the
contributions to the Democratic National Committee and many of these
contributions were made
"with a distinct idea on the part of the givers that they will have an opportunity to express their views and have them seriously considered on such questions as the present Palestine question. There was a feeling among the Jews that the United States was not doing what it should to solicit votes in the United Nations General Assembly in favour of the Palestine partition, and'beyond this, the Jews would expect the United States to do its utmost to implement the partition decision if it is voted by the United Nations through force if necessary'."
This quotation reveals the
process of progressively raising the bid for Zionist funds and the Zionist
vote which went on behind the scenes. At the start only United States support
for the partition proposal had been "expected".
Within a few weeks, this
"expectation" had risen to the demand that the United States should "solicit"
the votes of other countries in support of partition and should use American
troops to enforce partition, and the party-manager was quite accustomed to
such notions.
If American troops in the
1950's or 1960's find themselves in the Middle East, any of them who have
read Mr. Forrestal's Diaries should know how they come to be
there.
Mr. Forrestal must have acted
from a sense of duty, not of hope, when he implored Mr. McGrath "to give
a lot of thought to this matter because it involved not merely the Arabs
of the Middle East, but also might involve the whole Moslem world with its
four hundred millions of people: Egypt, North Africa, India and
Afghanistan".
While Mr. Forrestal fought
this losing battle behind the curtained windows of the White House and of
party-headquarters, Dr. Weizmann, in Washington, New York and Lake Success
was indefatigably organizing "the vote" on partition. He was having his
difficulties, but was rescued from them at this culminant moment when he
found "a welcome and striking change" among some of those "wealthy Jews"
who formerly had opposed Zionism.
At this belated stage in his
narrative he first mentions Mr. Bernard Baruch, saying that Mr. Baruch had
formerly been "an oppositionist Jew", one of the "rich and powerful Jews
who were against the idea of the Jewish National Home, but they did not know
very much about the subject".
One can only speculate about
the exact composition and nature of the "Jewish International" which Dr.
Kastein described as having come into existence around the start of this
century. It is permissible, in the light of all that has happened in these
fifty years, to envisage it as a permanent, high directorate, spread over
all nation-state boundaries, the membership of which probably changes only
when gaps are left by death.
If that is its nature, a
reasonable further inference would be that Dr. Weizmann was a very high
functionary, perhaps the highest functionary, subordinate to it, but that
undoubtedly there was a body superior to him. In that case, I would judge
that its four most important members, in the United States at that period,
would have been Mr. Bernard Baruch, first, and Senator Herbert Lehman, Mr.
Henry Morgenthau Junior and Justice Felix Frankfurter, next.
If there were a doubt, it
would previously have attached to Mr. Baruch, who had never publicly associated
himself with "leftist" causes or with Zionism. His great crony, Mr. Winston
Churchill, quoted Mr. Baruch's "negative view" about Zionism to Dr. Weizmann,
who in consequence (as he says) "took great care not to touch on the Jewish
problem" when he earlier met Mr. Baruch in America.
Nevertheless, at this decisive moment
Mr. Baruch suddenly "changed a great deal" (Dr. Weizmann) and his support,
added to the Zionist "pressure" that was being exerted on American politics,
was determining. Dr. Weizmann, as he hurried round the lobbies at Lake Success,
learned that the American delegation was opposed to the partition of Palestine.
Thereon he enlisted the "particularly helpful" support of Mr. Baruch (until
then, for forty years or more, regarded as an opponent of Zionism even by
such intimates as Mr. Winston Churchill!) and also of the junior Mr. Henry
Morgenthau (whose name attaches to the plan of "blind vengeance" adopted
by Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill at Ottawa in 1944)
Mr. Baruch presumably did
not hold Dr. Weizmann in the awe which seems to have seized the Western
politicians at the Zionist leader's approach. Therefore, his sudden
support of Zionism must denote either an abrupt conversion or the revelation
of a feeling earlier concealed; in either case, his intervention was decisive
as will be seen.
Dr. Weizmann was well supported
by the other powerful Jews in the Democratic Party. Senator Lehman was head
of UNRRA when it was used to smuggle the Eastern Jews across Europe to Palestine,
and had demanded General Morgan's resignation for publicly calling attention
to this mass-movement of people; his part in the drama was already
plain.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter was
equally busy; Mr. Forrestal was told by Mr. Loy Henderson (in charge of Middle
Eastern Affairs in the State Department) that "very great pressure had been
put on him as well as Mr. Lovett to get active American solicitation for
United Nations votes for the Palestine partition; he said Felix Frankfurter
and Justice Murphy had both sent messages to the Phillipines delegate strongly
urging his vote" (this is the same Mr. Frankfurter who called on Mr. House
at the 1919 Peace Conference in Paris "to talk about the Jews in Palestine";
he was also the devoted instructor of Mr. Alger Hiss at the Harvard Law
School.)
Having such support, Dr. Weizmann
was a besieging general backed by superior armies when he called on the citadel's
commander, President Truman, on November 19, 1947 to demand
that the United States support the partition of Palestine, and furthermore,
that the Negev
district (to which Dr. weizmann
attached "great importance") be included in the Zionist
territory.
"Mr. Truman's discipline was exemplary: he promised me that he would communicate at once with the American delegation" (Dr. Weizmann).
Out at Lake Success the chief
American delegate, Mr. Herschel Johnson, as he was about to inform the Zionist
representative of the American decision to vote against the inclusion of
the Negev, was called to the telephone and received, through President Truman,
Dr. Weizmann's orders.
With that the deed was done
and on November 29, 1947 the General Assembly of the United Nations recommended
(Zionist propaganda always says "decided") that "independent Arab and Jewish
states, and the specific international regime for the City of Jerusalem"
should come into existence after termination of the British "Mandate" on
August 1, 1948.
The vote was 31 against 13
with 10 abstentions. The manner in which the American vote was procured has
been shown. As to some of the other votes, Under Secretary Robert Lovett
said at the next Cabinet lunch (December 1, 1947) that "he had never in his
life been subject to so much pressure as he had been in the last three
days".
The Firestone Tire and Rubber
Company, which had a concession in Liberia, reported (he said) that it had
been asked by telephone to instruct its representative in Liberia "to bring
pressure on the Liberian Government to vote in favour of partition".
(Mr. Loy Henderson's account of the "great pressure" used to get American
"solicitation" of the votes of small countries has already been quoted).
Thus was the "vote" of "the
United Nations" produced in the most explosive issue of this century's world
affairs.
At the Cabinet lunch immediately
after this "vote" Mr. Forrestal returned to the attack:
"I remarked that many thoughtful people of the Jewish faith had deep misgivings about the wisdom of the Zionists' pressures for a jewish state in Palestine. . . The decision was fraught with great danger for the future security of this country".
He then discussed the question
(December 3, 1947) with Mr. James F. Byrnes, who had ceased to be Secretary
of State earlier in the year (his relegation was foreseeable; it was he who
disclosed President Roosevelt's pledge to Ibn Saoud).
Mr. Byrnes said President
Truman's actions had placed the British Government "in a most difficult position"
and added that Mr. David K. Niles had been brought into the White House among
the "Palace Guard" with which the "adviser on Jewish affairs" and Judge Rosenman
had helped write presidential speeches. These men (said Mr. Byrnes) told
Mr. Truman
"that Dewey was about to come out with a statement favouring the Zionist position in Palestine, and had insisted that unless the President anticipated this moment New York State would be lost to the Democrats".
Here Mr. Byrnes gave another
glimpse of the behind-the-scenes action. The two candidates for the highest
office in the United States (Mr. Thomas Dewey was the prospective nominee
of the other party, the Republican) in these portrayals look like children,
incited against each other by the offer of a dangling bag of sweets. Mr.
Truman, by doing the Zionist bidding in the matter of partition, had by no
means ensured the Democrats of the prize, for the election was still a year
distant and during that time the Zionists were to demand more and more, and
the Republican party to bid higher and higher for the dangling reward.
Mr. Forrestal, in desperation,
now tried to convince the Republican Mr. Dewey:
"I said the Palestine matter was a matter of the deepest concern to me in terms of the security of the nation, and asked, once more, if the parties could not agree to take this question out of their electoral campaigning".
Governor (of New York State)
Dewey's response was much the same as President Truman's:
"It was a difficult matter to get results because of the intemperate attitude of the Jewish people who had taken Palestine as the emotional symbol, because the Democratic party would not be willing to relinquish the advantages of the Jewish vote".
Thereon Mr. Dewey continued
to try and outdo the Democratic politicians in his bid for "the Jewish vote"
(and to his own surprise nevertheless lost the election).
Mr. Forrestal next tried to
strengthen the hand of the State Department, in its resistance to the president,
by a memorandum (January 21, 1948) in which he analyzed the dangers to American
national security flowing from the entanglement:
"It is doubtful if there is any segment of our foreign relations of greater importance or of greater danger. . . to the security of the United States than our relations in the Middle East".
He warned against doing "permanent
injury to our relations with the Moslem world" and "a stumble into war".
He said he had found "some small encouragement" among individual Republicans
for his proposal to take the question "out of party-politics", but among
the Democrats had met a feeling
"that a substantial part of the Democratic funds come from Zionist sources inclined to ask in return for a lien upon this part of our national policy".
The last nine words are explicit
and are literally correct. The Zionists demanded the submission of American
state policy and offered in return a four-year tenure of the presidency to
the highest bidder.
Whether they were in truth
able to deliver what they offered has never been tested; the party-managers
took them at their word and the candidates of both parties put on the sackcloth
of submission before they were nominated, knowing (or believing) that they
would not even achieve nomination unless they wore it.
Mr. Forrestal urged the Secretary
of State (General Marshall) to remonstrate with the President, pointing out
that a large body of Jews "hold the view that the present zeal of the Zionists
can have most dangerous consequences, not merely in their divisive effects
in American life, but in the long run on the position of Jews through the
world".
Under-Secretary Lovett, on
reading mr. Forrestal's memorandum, produced one already prepared by the
Planning Staff of the State Department. This informed the President that
the partition plan was "not workable" (exactly as British governments had
been warned by their colonial administrators that "the Mandate" was "not
workable"); that the United States was not committed to support it if it
could not be effected without force; that it was against American interest
to supply arms to the Zionists while refusing them to the Arabs; that the
United States should not take on itself to enforce the "recommendation" of
partition and should try to secure withdrawal of the partition
proposal.
Mr. Lovett added, "the use
of the United Nations by others as a propaganda platform is complicating
our conduct of foreign relations" and said the State Department was "seriously
embarrassed and handicapped by the activities of Niles at the White House
in going directly to the President on matters involving
Palestine".
On that very day, the
Under-Secretary complained, he had once more been under "pressure". Mr. Niles
had telephoned from the White House "expressing the hope that the embargo
on the sales of arms to the Zionists would be lifted".
At that point Mr. Forrestal
evidently became an acute annoyance to the powers behind the White House
and his elimination was decided. First he received a visit from Mr. Franklin
D. Roosevelt junior. Whatever the father's deathbed pledge not to take "hostile
action against the Arabs", the son (a New York politician, with presidential
hopes) was an extreme Zionist partisan.
Mr. Forrestal pointedly said,
"I thought the methods that had been used by people outside of the Executive
branch of the government to bring coercion and duress on other nations in
the General Assembly bordered closely on scandal".
He records (as if with surprise)
that his visitor "made no threats" in response to this, and he then explained
his proposals to "lift the question out of politics" by agreement between
the parties.
Mr. Roosevelt, his father's
son, replied that "this was impossible, that the nation was too far committed,
and that, furthermore, the Democratic Party would be bound to lose and the
Republicans to gain by such an agreement".
Mr, Forrestal answered that
"failure to go along with the Zionists might lose the states of New York,
Pennsylvania and California," (the 'pivotal states' earlier mentioned by
party-manager McGrath)
"I thought it was about time that somebody should pay some consideration to whether we might not lose the United States".
No comment by Mr. Roosevelt
is recorded, but he was a harbinger of ill for Mr. Forrestal because on this
same day (February 3, 1948) came the intervention of Mr. Bernard Baruch.
Mr. Baruch, earlier an opponent of Zionism, was now so zealous in the cause
that he advised Mr. Forrestal "not to be active in this matter. . . I was
already identified, to a degree that was not in my own interests, with opposition
to the United Nations policy on Palestine".
Ominous words for Mr. Forrestal!
The annals here record for
the first time a specific intervention by Mr. Baruch in high affairs, and
its nature. His counsel was that Mr. Forrestal, a Cabinet officer, consider
his own interest, which was endangered; until that time Mr. Forrestal as
a responsible Cabinet officer had considered only the interest of his country.
Mr. Forrestal does not say whether he saw in this advice anything threatening;
his allusion to Mr. Roosevelt on the same day shows that the thought of "threats"
was in his mind.
He then gave way to the fear
which in the end cowed nearly all men who strove against the thrall of Zion.
Four days later (February 7, 1948) he drew up a last paper on the subject
which he never submitted to the President, but which contains something of
historical importance. He said that
on February 6
"Eisenhower told me that effective United States participation in a Palestine police force would involve about one division with appropriate supporting units".
At that time, therefore, General
Eisenhower (then Chief of Staff) was drafting plans for the potential engagement
of American troops in Palestine. Mr. Forrestal put away this last memorandum.
On February 12 and 18 he made
two final appeals to general Marshall to contend with the president and the
party-managers and at that point his efforts ceased.
His desisting availed him
nothing for within a twelvemonth he was literally hounded to death. His end
needs to be described here, before the armed seizure of Palestine is recorded;
it is the classic case of persecution by defamation, leading to
death.
I first went to America early
in 1949 and was perplexed by the venom of the attacks, in the press and radio,
on one Mr. James Forrestal, Secretary for Defence. I knew nothing of him
but his name, and the part he played in this affair (as above recorded) was
then entirely unknown to the public. Nevertheless they read or heard daily
that he was insane, a coward who had left his wife to be attacked by a burglar,
a tax defaulter, and all manner of other things.
By chance I met a friend of
his who told me that he had been so reduced by this persecution that those
near to him were gravely alarmed. A few weeks later he threw himself from
a high window, leaving in his room some copied verses from Greek tragedy
which ended with the refrain, "Woe, woe! will be the cry. . ."
[Note - JP: It has since been disclosed that,
according to in-depth investigation, Mr. Forrestal was most probably "thrown
bodily from the window"; i.e. MURDERED!]
American libel laws are liberal
and differ from state to state, and litigation is long. Even a successful
action may not bring redress. Hardly any limit is in practice set to what
may be said about a man singled out for defamation; the slanders are printed
in the language that incites mob-passions and when broadcast are uttered
in rabid accents, that recalled to me the voices of primitive African
tribespeople in moments of catalepsy.
Among Mr. Forrestal's effects
was found a scrapbook full of these attacks, and towards the end he could
not listen to the radio. The refuse of calumny was emptied on his head and
at the end two broadcasters joined for the kill. One of them announced (January
9, 1949) that President Truman would "accept Forrestal's resignation within
a week" (and followed this with some slander about shares in the German Dye
Trust).
On January 11, the second
broadcaster told the millions that President Truman would by that time have
accepted Mr. Forrestal's resignation, had not the first broadcaster anticipated
the event (the Jewel-robbery story was added to this).
A few weeks earlier President
Truman had told the Press that he had asked Mr. Forrestal not to resign;
on March 1 he sent for Mr. Forrestal and demanded his immediate resignation,
without explanation, to be effective from May 1. Mr. Forrestal committed
suicide on May 21. At the funeral ceremony Mr. Truman described him as "a
victim of the war"!
(In parentheses, at that time
another man was being hounded to the same death, which he escaped, later
in the same year only by the failure of his suicide attempt. His persecution
came from the same defamationist source, though his offence was in the other
field, Communism. Mr. Whittaker Chambers sinned by his efforts to expose
Communist infiltration of the American Government.
I was in America at the time
of his ordeal, which is described in his book; this contains the striking
example, to which I earlier alluded, of the Talmudic practice of "cursing
by an angry, fixed look" (the Jewish Encyclopedia). Literal Talmudists would
presumably see in Mr. Chamber's suicide attempt, and in the ill-health which
subsequently afflicted him, a token of the literal efficacy of "the Law"
in this respect).
After Mr. Forrestal's retreat
into silence, at the warning of Mr. Baruch, the responsible men at the State
Department continued their struggle, headed by General Marshall. (All this
while, in England, Mr. Bevin was carrying on his lonely fight against the
Conservative opposition and against the mass of his own party alike). At
one point, for the first time since 1917, the responsible Cabinet officers
and officials in both countries seemed to have won the day.
This was in March 1948. Violence
in Palestine had so greatly increased after the United Nations' "recommendation"
for the country's bisection that the Security Council grew alarmed and beat
a retreat.
Even President Truman was
shaken and his representative in the Security Council announced the reversal
of American policy, proposing (March 19, 1948) that the partition proposal
be suspended, that a truce be arranged, and that the end of the "Mandate"
be followed by a "Trusteeship" (this was in effect the proposal of the State
Department memorandum of January).
At the last moment the idea
of "the Jewish state" thus seemed about to collapse. The post-war return
to reason was beginning (that process which Mr. Lloyd George, thirty years
before, had warningly called the "thaw") and if the coup now failed only
a third world war could provide another opportunity.
The "Trusteeship" would be
the "mandate" in a new form, but with the United States as the country chiefly
involved, and in another ten or twenty years America, foreseeably, would
find the "Trusteeship" as "unworkable", under Zionist pressure, as the British
had found the "Mandate".
It was then or never and the
Zionists struck at once. They presented the "United Nations" with the
accomplished fact by bisecting Palestine themselves.
The terrorist deed by means
of which this was accomplished was the result of the policy adopted at the
World Zionist Congress of 1946, where "the demoralizing forces in the movement"
(Dr. Weizmann's words) had recommended methods of "Resistance. . . defence.
. . activism", and Dr. Weizmann, who knew what was meant, had been deposed
for objecting to them.
http://www.sweetliberty.org/issues/israel/zionist.html
Δεν υπάρχουν σχόλια:
Δημοσίευση σχολίου